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In this paper, I question a widespread reading of a passage in the last part of the Phaedrus
dealing with the science of dialectic. According to this reading, the passage announces a new
method peculiar to the later Plato aiming at defining natural kinds. I show that the
Phaedrus itself does not support such a reading. As an alternative reading, I suggest that
the science of dialectic, as discussed in the passage, must be seen as dealing primarily
with philosophical rhetoric and knowledge of human souls.
Psychês peirata iôn ouk an exeuroio, pasan epiporeuomenos hodon; houo bathyn logon
echei
-Herclitus, Fr. 45
As is well known the question of the unity of Plato's Phaedrus is a difficult one. The
first part of the dialogue seems preoccupied with the topic of eros, the second with
rhetoric and logos. Perhaps in someway uniting these parts,we find the overall ques-
tion of beauty.1 In addition to these broader topics, the question of sophrosyne and
hybris looms large, not only through the motive of self-knowledge, which Socrates
brings into the dialogue from the very beginning (229e), but also through the
notion of eros, defined in Socrates' first speech as a kind of desire, epithymia tis,
set over against acquired opinion or judgement (237d).2 We are also confronted
with the themes of the immortality of the soul, the relationship between the
parts of the soul, of the ecstatic vision of the eternal forms, of the science of dialectic
and its relationship to ordinary rhetoric as well as of the question how the written
and the spokenword relate to each other. If the Phaedrus is to be regarded as a living
animal, it would seem to resemble the howling, many-headed typhoon, which
Socrates does not know whether he resembles, far more than the simpler creature
with a “share in a divine … nature” (230a) which he hopes to be like.
I will not try to tackle this thorny issue here. Instead, I will focus on a – perhaps
simpler – problem pertaining to unity. In an often quoted passage in the last part
of the dialogue, 265d-266b, where Socrates describes the art of dialectic, the ques-
tion of unity and its relation to plurality is made into an explicit theme. In this
paper, I wish to ask what the point of the passage is. More precisely, I wish to
address the problem how one can understand Socrates' description of dialectic
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in the last part of the Phaedrus if one focuses on what it is meant to spell out in the
context in which it is introduced.
In the first part of this paper, I will sketch what I take to be a fairly widespread
understanding of the passage, namely that it is the first announcement of a new
method which Plato developed in the last period of his work, consisting in con-
ceptual analysis through division of genera (gene¯) into species (eide¯) by means of
differentia specifica. By comparing this understanding with the way Socrates'
speeches in the first part of the dialogue are composed, since this is what the
passage in question purports to tell us something about, I will try to show why
I do not find it plausible. In the second part of the paper I shall therefore
proceed to take a closer look at Socrates' second speech, since I believe that the
content of it, although ‘mythical’ rather than ‘logical’, is of great importance
for Socrates' endeavour to reach an understanding of the nature of eros. Since
the understanding of eros seems to be what dialectic is supposed to deliver, I
will go on to suggest how one can make a possible connection between what is
said about dialectic in the 265d-266b passage and what we are told about soul
in the great myth. In the final part of my paper, I will try to make this suggested
connection more plausible by linking the discussion of rhetoric and dialectic in
the second part of the dialogue with the myth of the soul found in Socrates'
second speech. This will support my suggestion of regarding dialectic as
connected with ‘myths of the soul’ but it will leave us with some paradoxes
which are connected with the theme of self-knowledge.
I
Let us turn to the passage dealing with dialectic in the Phaedrus. The passage is
not very long but rather complex. It is embedded in a larger discussion of the
difference between good and bad writing as well as speaking (to me¯ kalo¯s legein
te kai graphein; 258d), a question which is raised due to Phaedrus' concern that
Socrates, in his second speech on eros, might have outdone Lysias as a speech-
writer. The passage describes a procedure carried out in two steps:
“The first consists in seeing together (synoro¯nta) things that are scattered about
everywhere and collecting them into one kind (mian idean), so that by defining
each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give.”
(265d) Socrates goes on to illustrates this step by saying that this is what his
previous speeches did by defining love, thereby making the speeches, if not
true, then at least able to proceed smoothly and consistently with themselves.
The second step is “to be able to cut up each kind according to its species [eide¯]
along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might
do.” (265e) This second step Socrates also illustrates by referring to what his
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previous speeches did, namely that, once they had established “unsoundness of
mind to be by nature one single kind”, they proceeded to split up mental
derangement, thereby arriving at two kinds of love, one left-handed, as it were,
the other right-handed.
Such divisions and collections, Socrates goes on to explain, is something he
loves, since they make him able to think and to speak, and the practitioners of
such a procedure are, he suggests, best called dialecticians (266b-c). So what is
this dialectical ability? As we can see, both steps are preoccupied with forms or
types, ideai and eide¯, collecting scattered things towards one form, and then divid-
ing this form according to other forms. I believe Hackforth's comment on the
passage still captures fairly well how many interpreters read it: “It is in this
section that Plato for the first time formally expounds that philosophical
method – the method of dialectic – which from now onwards becomes so promi-
nent in his thought, especially in the Sophist, Statesman and Philebus… here we
have Plato's first announcement of a new discovery to which he attaches the
highest importance.”3
Hackforth goes on to assert (p.136) that this new method cannot be compared
with what is said about dialectic in the Republic. The novelty consists in not
trying to deduce all knowledge and reality from a highest principle, that is, the
idea of the good. Dialectic is now rather a “piecemeal approach to knowledge”
which consists “in a mapping out of one field after another by classification per
genera et species”.4 This new method is often supposed to be connected with a
change in Plato's conception of the ideas, in particular as regards their interrelat-
edness. However commentators conceive of the ontological status of the ideas in
the later dialogues, it seems fair to say that the majority take it for granted that
Plato's new method is supposed to define something by placing it, to quote
from Notomi's recent commentary on the Sophist “in the network or relationship
between kinds”,5 which, to quote another recent commentary on the same
dialogue “presupposes that notions or concepts, Begriffe, are species and kinds
that are superordinate and subordinate to each other”.6 From Hackforth's
comment to the passage it is clear that he regards it as of a programmatic kind,
announcing a new method of dialectic which is primarily applied in later
works, a view which seems to be shared by many other scholars.
Although I do not doubt that it can be fruitful to see the passage in connection
with other late dialogues where the science of dialectic is discussed, I have two
reasons for not doing this here. My first reason is purely pragmatic. The Phaedrus
passage does indeed seem to have a close resemblance to two other methodologi-
cal passages, namely 253a-e in the Sophist and 14c-18d in the Philebus,7 and these
passages may in turn be regarded as closely connected with the divisions that are
performed in the Sophist and the Statesman. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to
determine on the one hand what these methodological passages are meant to
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spell out,8 and on the other how they are related to the divisions found in the dia-
logues. Thus, if the comparison between the Phaedrus and these other dialogues is
to be successful, I take it that a serious interpretation of all these dialogues is
needed, which is obviously not possible in this paper.
My second reason for not wanting to bring in other dialogues here is of a
methodological character. The general tendency of much recent scholarship on
Plato is to regard Platonic dialogues as self-contained unities. If one follows
this trend, a difficult passage in any dialogue should ideally be explained by the
specific context in which it is found, not by reference to other dialogues,
which is what I will try to do. It may turn out that the result of doing this will
not be fully satisfying, and this may in turn explain why commentators tend to
read the Phaedrus passage in light of other dialogues rather than in light of the
Phaedrus itself.
If we look at the passage 265c-d, which precedes the discussion of the two steps
involved in dialectic, we see that Socrates claims that the two speeches he has
given on the subject of eros contained two forms (dyoin eidoin), the power
(dynamis) of which it would be good to grasp through an art, a techne¯. These
two forms are what he then describes as the twofold procedure of collection
and division, and dialectic is supposedly the art which captures the power of
these activities. As regards the content of his two speeches, Socrates somewhat
surprisingly claims that it was all said playfully or by way of a joke, a paidia.
How are we are to understand this remark?
According to Ernst Heitsch, Socrates' comment signals that it is the methodo-
logical prerequisites of the two speeches that are sanctioned as true, not the
“mythological exposition built upon their basis.”9 These prerequisites are, accor-
ding to Heitsch, a “particular way of carrying out conceptual analysis.” Heitsch
seems to be right in pointing out that Socrates suggests that the two speeches,
seen together and from a more formal perspective, are meant to illustrate the
procedure characteristic of dialectic. He also seems to be right in claiming that
the illustrations Socrates gives of each of the two steps of dialectical reasoning in
the passage 265d-266b give the impression that collection and division is to be
found in the way that the two speeches define eros, i.e. in the way they carry out
“conceptual analysis”, as Heitsch puts it. If he is also right that the contents of
the speeches are not important in this regard, it must be the divisions and collec-
tions defining eros which illustrate what dialectic is, and these can be regarded
wholly apart from, for instance, what is said (mythically) about the soul. So let
us look at how the two speeches actually define eros.
At the beginning of the first speech, we find a preliminary definition of eros,
namely that it is a kind of desire (epythimia); as Socrates claims at 265d, this
definition is what enabled the speech to proceed in good order. Interestingly,
in the first speech the definition follows directly upon Socrates' claim that
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unless one knows what one is deliberating about, one will miss, harmatanein,
one's target; most people, he goes on to say, do not know that they are ignorant
of the essence or nature, the ousia, of what they talk about, which explains why
they are often mislead (237b-c).10 But once Socrates has stated this – to my mind –
sound, Socratic principle,11 which he repeats in the second half of the dialogue (cf.
263a-c, 265d), he immediately goes on to claim that “everybody plainly knows”
that “love is some kind of desire”; this ‘fact’, taken together with the commonsen-
sical notion that desire stands in opposition to “acquired judgement that pursues
what is best” makes the basis for the entire speech. No attempt is made at deter-
mining whether what everybody knows actually corresponds with the nature of
eros.
This initial determination of eros is then followed by something that may look
like a procedure of division. At 238a Socrates claims that desire, when in
command of a person, leads to hybris, and that the forms of hybris are as many
as the objects of desire. When the object of desire is beauty, the name we have
to give this kind of hybris is eros.
In the first speech, we thus seem to have a simultaneous and perhaps somewhat
circular procedure of division and collection: eros is first defined as a kind of
epithymia, and the division of epithymia according to its different objects again
leads to a definition of eros. That eros is a hybristic desire for beauty is, as Socrates
with veiled head claims, “a definition of the subject” of the discussion, stating
what eros “really is” (238d-e). We thus see that, although Socrates' first speech
clearly states that one must come to an agreement about the nature or essence
of the subject one wishes to discuss instead of following ordinary belief about
it, its apparently technical procedure does nothing else than spell out the
content of ordinary belief. This problem cannot be explained away simply by
saying that Socrates isn't speaking in his own name. It is true that his definition
merely seems to echo Lysias' speech (cf. 231d), but nevertheless the speech is sup-
posedly meant to illustrate a specific method.
We may wonder if the picture is any better in the second speech. Here eros is no
longer defined as epithymia, but rather as madness, mania. But since the first
speech has suggested that the non-lover, free from desire, is in control of
himself, thereby being sound-minded, that is so¯phro¯n, in opposition to the
lover who is mad (cf. 241a), the new definition of eros can be seen as an elaboration
of the same common opinion spelled out in the first speech. In fact, if we take it
that way we can make sense of Socrates' later claim that both speeches defined eros
as a type of madness (265a). Having first defined eros as a kind of madness, the
second speech goes on to divide the kinds of madness, first by splitting
madness into ordinary madness, “produced by human illness” as Socrates later
specifies (also at 265a), and another type of madness that is god-induced, then
by dividing divine madness into kinds, where (good) eros is then proclaimed, at
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249d, to be a fourth kind of mania. As regards the technical procedure of division
and collection, the second speech seems to be as circular as the first: eros is first
defined as madness and a specific kind of madness is then said to be eros. We
may well wonder if collection and division in the two speeches is not simply a
complicated way of postulating something about eros, intended to blur the fact
that no conceptual analysis is carried out at all.
Of course, one could object that when Socrates at 264e-266a claims that the
two speeches together defined two separate kinds of eros, one left-handed, the
other right-handed, he is saying that only the two speeches taken as one illustrate
the method of collection and division. The two speeches would then exemplify
the dialectician's ability to distinguish different forms of something that to the
ordinary eye might look identical, by differentiating bad from good eros.12 The
problem with this objection is that the impression of dialectic as a kind of activity
revealing the essence of something or, to use Heitsch's expression, as a method of
conceptual analysis, does not get much better if we do that. Seen as one, the two
speeches together define eros as a kind of madness, splits madness in two, one
ordinary, another divine. The first speech then goes on to deal with the first
type of madness, the other with the other. In effect, we get a definition of two
kinds of eros, one brute, the other divine or philosophical. That this division in
itself does not require a new, profound way of carrying out conceptual analysis
can be seen from the speeches of Pausanias and Eryximachos in the Symposium.
In other words, we may seriously wonder whether the method of collection and
division teaches us anything new about eros at all. If we disregard the contents of
the two speeches and only focus on the formal aspects of the definitions, the
method seems simply to consist in focusing on a wider or broader term that
people generally believe includes what you want to define, and then ‘dividing’
this general class into sub-classes, pointing out that what you want to define is
one of them. This may be adequate for a nominal definition, but it surely
seems a rather unconvincing procedure for arriving at real definitions. If the
method of dialectic only brings to light what most people already know or
believe, it seems to be nothing more than a (rather crude) devise by which one
is able to give a speech a clearly stated starting-point.
To me, this seems a less than attractive result, if only due to the fact that
Socrates declares dialectic to be the foundation of true rhetoric, described as
soul-guidance (psychago¯gia) at 261a and 271d, and that he will follow anyone
able to carry out dialectical divisions “as if he were a god” (266b-c). If true rhetoric,
that is, soul-guidance, is dialectic or at least founded on dialectic, and if dialectic is
the knowledge possessed by the philosopher, as the Phaedrus (and other dialogues
as well) certainly seem to suggest (cf. 261a), we should expect that dialectic is more
than the ability to make nominal definitions. We would seem justified in suppos-
ing that it somehow should lead to a real understanding of the essence or nature of
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what it contemplates and not stay content with spelling out the opinions that
most people have about the matter in question. Of course, I do not mean to
say that common opinions, doxai, have no role to play in the endeavour to
reach such an understanding,13 but merely that if the procedure of ‘collections’
and ‘divisions’ does not contain – or is not connected with – a critical way of
testing whether common opinion is true or not, such a procedure seems to be
of little value to a Socratic notion of philosophy.
On the other hand, I readily admit that my interpretation of the text so far does
not seem fair to the text. Socrates' speeches contain much more than the simple
‘collections’ and ‘divisions’ I have tried to extrapolate from them. In fact, the
interpretation given so far seems to reduce Socrates' attempt to define eros to a
parody, and that in a rather violently way. Indeed, it does. And this is my
point. If we follow Socrates' suggestion in the short passage on dialectic and
focus merely on the formal or ‘analytical’ steps of division and collection as
what is of importance while disregarding the content of the speeches, we loose
the reason for taking the formal elements serious at the same time. For I
believe that what I have presented until now is all that can reasonably be described
as formal steps of division and collection pertaining to the notion of eros that one
can find in the two speeches. If one looks at these steps on their own, without
regard for what they divide, they seem to be of little interest.
It is therefore worthwhile to point out the – perhaps simple – fact that Socrates
didn't say that the content of his speeches was irrelevant, merely that it was
playful. Why should what is said playfully not be worth taking seriously? In
the Statesman, for instance, at 268d, we find the great myth of the reversed
cosmos, which helps correcting the – at that point – shipwrecked procedure of
diairetical divisions, and this myth is explicitly referred to as a joke or play. In
general, Plato is a humorous writer, a fact which should be taken quite seriously.14
Perhaps it would be better to take a closer look at some of the contents15 of
Socrates' speeches then, after all, especially the second.16
II
I have already noted that Socrates began his first speech by demanding that the
interlocutors in any conversation should reach a common definition of the
essence, the ousia, of what they are discussing (237b-c). Apparently, neither the
first nor the second speech reaches any such definition of eros through collection
or division. Instead, what this procedure seems to do is to spell out different doxai
about eros. But in the second speech, at 245c, Socrates tries to define the ousia, not
of eros (or, as we shall see, not directly of eros), but of the soul. Moreover, he states
that it is exactly in order to show that eros is not a mischievous kind of madness,
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but indeed god-given, that it is necessary to say what the essence of the soul is by
“examining what it does and what is done to it”. This echoes his former demand
at 237c8-9 of examining what eros is (ti pot’ estin) as well as what power (dynamis) it
has. If the division of divine madness into different kinds is to save eros from con-
demnation, an investigation of soul is apparently necessary.
It is probably this investigation of soul, its nature and form, its doings and
sufferings that Socrates later describes as being playful. At the end of the palinode,
at 257a, he excuses himself for having used somewhat poetical words. At 253c7 he
refers to his description of the soul as a hybrid creature, consisting of a charioteer
and a couple of horses that have grown together into a unity, as a myth. His proof
that eros is god-given madness will not, he claims at 245c, convince the clever, only
the wise.
Let me pause on this last point a short while. Such a clever person, a deinos, is
perhaps like the one already mentioned by Socrates at 229d, namely the man
whose main occupation was to deliver rational reductions of traditional mytho-
logical creatures such as the Hippocentaur, the Chimera and the Gorgon. Let
us remember that Socrates there claimed to have no spare time for such activities,
preoccupied as he is by finding out what he is. It now turns out that he does have
time to tell myths of his own, in order to illustrate the nature of the human soul.
I believe it is plausible that the myth about the soul is somehow connected to
Socrates' quest for self-knowledge and his initial uncertainty concerning what sort
of creature he is. Presumably Socrates' quest for self-knowledge is not simply the
question who the person Socrates is, but also of what he is, as a man. If what man
is, considered as soul, is what Socrates tries to state in the myth contained in the
palinode, it may seem that mythology, playfulness, poetic expression or whatever
one wants to term it, is at the heart of the Socratic enterprise.
I will have to abstain from interpreting Socrates' difficult myth in any detail.
Here, I will limit myself to the question: why does Socrates present us with a
myth in the first place? And how does this affect the attempted definition of
eros? The most obvious answer to the first question, which Socrates explicitly
states at 246a3-6, is that it is not possible for a human being to state in detail
what the form, the idea, of the human soul is. We may wonder why that is so.
I believe that an important reason for this is that the idea of the soul referred to
in the passage cannot refer to a Platonic idea.17 If movement is what characterizes
the soul, if self-movement is the “very essence” of soul, as is claimed in the argu-
ment for the immortality of the soul (245e) that prefigures the myth, the soul
cannot be static, unchanging etc., i.e. it cannot posses the qualities that ideas
are traditionally ascribed. Indeed, the picture we get from other dialogues as
well is that the soul is not itself an idea but rather that which can relate to
ideas.18 But if the soul is not an idea, but essentially movement and change, a
movement which, in order to understand, relates itself, as much as possible, to
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eternal ideas, this seems to explain why Socrates can at best tell what the form of
the soul is like, not what it is, i.e. why the soul escapes strict definition and must
be the subject of a mythical or poetic account. We may thus suppose that it is not
only people who come to the doors of poetry who cannot rely solely on skill but
needs the madness of the muses in addition, as Socrates claims 245a, but that this
also applies to those who try to enter the halls of philosophy.
If this reasoning is sound, we get the following picture of how myth relates to
the science of dialectic, as described in the Phaedrus. If the soul is not a Platonic
idea, and if any serious definition of erosmust include an investigation of the soul,
since eros is a movement of the soul, as Socrates' second speech indicates (249d
ff.), a definition of eros cannot be attained through a collection and division of
Platonic ideas. The division of eros into good and bad eros receives its substance,
so to speak, from the grand myth of the soul.
Let me try to give some suggestions why this reading appears attractive to me.
The meagre result one gets if one focuses solely on what looks like divisions of
natural kinds in Socrates' two attempts at defining eros doesn't seem to merit
his rather high-strung description of dialectic. Now, this praise may of course
be understood as partly ironical, as Griswold seems to take it.19 The point
would then be indirect, namely to show that the technical aspect of philosophy,
division and collection, is at best a tool, but, as a tool, inferior to the living dia-
logue characteristic of philosophy. I find this somewhat unconvincing. I grant
that it may be difficult to understand what division and collection is meant to
do, but it seems clear to me, from what I would call the ‘tone’ of the so-called
later dialogues, that Plato did indeed regard the ability to see a scattered manifold,
whatever is meant by this, towards a unity, and in turn to see this unity as com-
posed of a manifold, as highly important to philosophy. To put this differently,
the ability to see likeness and difference in one and the same ‘look’, as it were,
without focusing abstractly on one aspect or the other (the question whether
the philosopher is like or unlike the sophist springs to mind), is, I believe, of
crucial importance to Plato.
In lack of a better explanation of why Plato has Socrates describe this ability in
such positive terms in the Phaedrus, I would therefore like to make the following
suggestion. What if what Socrates describes by collection and division is some-
thing else than the ability to define something, i.e. eros, by genus proximun
and differentia specifica? What if the myth of the soul that Socrates gives in his
second speech is intimately connected with dialectic, that is, with the ability to
perform collections and division?
As I pointed out at the beginning of the paper, dialectic consists, according to
what Socrates says in the 265d-66b passage, in the ability to see one idea or form
(mian idea) through many and to be able to cut this up according to other forms
(eide¯). Now, in the palinode, where justice and virtue, among other things, are
DIALECTIC OF EROS AND MYTH OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS
81
mentioned, we never find them referred to by the terms idea or eidos. Rather, they
are referred to as the things that are, to onta (247e) or the things outside heaven, ta
exo¯ tou ouranou (247c).
On the other hand, at 246a3-6, Socrates refers to the form of the soul as mian
idean. When he then goes on to give the likeness of the soul, i.e. that it is like a
charioteer and black and white horse grown into one, he identifies each of these
‘elements’, at 253c7-9, as the eide¯ of the soul. Perhaps it is this part of the myth,
rather than a procedure of dividing natural kinds, that Socrates is talking about
when he describes dialectic? The idea of identifying the steps of collection and
division with the myth about the soul seems to gain further support by a later
passage, namely 270d-e, where eide¯ is also used to describe the parts of anything
that isn't simple (haploun) but many-formed, as, for instance, the human soul.
Finally, at 271d the term of eidos is used to describe two things, on the one
hand the elements of the soul, on the other the different kinds of souls that
result, presumably, from the choice souls make of following different gods.
Perhaps what Socrates is talking about in the passage on dialectic is thus a specific
ability to look at human souls, characteristic of philosophically minded people.
Let me try to give a sketch of how this would connect the myth of the soul with
dialectic,mythos with logos. On the reading suggested here, the one form described
in the first step of dialectic as what is seen or collected from a dispersed manifold
would be the one soul common to all human beings. This soul is essentially
characterized by movement or erotic striving towards something and this is, in
some form or other, characteristic for all men. But eros is no simple or gentle
force, leading all men to insight or contemplation of the ‘hyperuranian
beings’.20 Indeed, eros can direct different men in different directions, partly,
one assumes, due to natural inclination, partly (and more importantly) due to
upbringing or education (paideia). A way to point this out is by giving a mythical
account of the soul, according to which there are different elements in it, so that
the unity or entity “soul” is shown to be a complex unity filled with tension and
strife. This can be regarded as one way of dividing the unity seen in the first step
of dialectical activity. A second kind of division can be found within the myth
when Socrates goes on to explain how different souls choose to follow different
gods (246e ff, 252c ff).21 To me it seems reasonable to suppose that this is
another way of saying that the first picture we get of the soul, as an erotic
being, which is somehow a unity characterised by plurality and tension, is
‘abstract’. It is abstract in so far as soul as ‘incarnated’ comes in many different
forms due to the fact that the relations in which the ‘elements’ of the soul
stand to each other may differ greatly, resulting in different ‘Weltanschaungen’
or conceptions of what goal one should strive towards.
I grant that this interpretation has some drawbacks. For instance, one may
suppose that idea is simply the term Socrates uses at 265 for something, anything
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when regarded as a whole, whereas eidos is the term he uses to designate a part.
If that is so, it is only natural that these terms are to be found in the earlier descrip-
tion of the relationship between the form of the soul and its parts, but this does
not mean that what Socrates describes as dialectic is specifically preoccupied with
the soul. A related objection would be that dialectic is supposed to be a universal
method. If it is, one may grant that dialectic is not simply a method for dividing
natural kinds, but can also be used to investigate things that are not ideas, natural
kinds or whatever one wants to call them, as for instance the human soul. But one
could then say that this is merely a special case which becomes important in the
Phaedrus because Socrates' speeches are on love. A partial answer to these objec-
tions can, I believe, be found in the second part of the dialogue. In the final part of
this paper, I will therefore turn to the question how dialectic and rhetoric relate to
each other and how this connects with the myth about the soul.
III
The general drift of the argument in the second part of the Phaedrus seems to be
the following: rhetoric cannot be a techne¯ unless it is founded on a real under-
standing of the subject it discusses. In order to speak or write beautifully, one
must understand what one speaks or writes about. And this insight is supposedly
arrived at through adequate philosophizing, i.e. through the exercise of dialectic.
Before I elaborate on how this connects with my suggestion that dialectic, as
described in the Phaedrus, is primarily concerned with the soul rather than
being a universal method for acquiring knowledge, I have to say something
about Socrates' claim that philosophy can transform rhetoric into a techne¯. For
what he says seems to pose a problem for my suggestion.
The drift of Socrates' argument, founding rhetoric on philosophy, may seem
like a typical Platonic move. Socrates suggests that if one is interested in rhetoric,
one should really care for philosophy and that the truth is more important than
opinions, and these suggestions are directed at Phaedrus, in order to turn his
unlimited love for speeches into a love for dialectic. In other words, Plato has
Socrates make a kind of protreptic argument. But what he actually says, when dis-
cussing rhetoric with Phaedrus, is not so obviously Platonic. For it may seem
rather surprising that dialectic should be able to transform rhetoric into a real
art, i.e. a techne¯, instead of being a mere knack, tribe¯ (260e). In the Gorgias, at
least, Socrates claims quite forcefully that rhetoric cannot be a techne¯. To state
Socrates' objection in a perhaps oversimplified way, a techne¯ must be something
that can be taught to others, and it must have a specific field of objects. Rhetoric
seems to violate both principles. It resembles a knack more than a science built on
teachable principles, on the one hand. On the other hand, since it claims to be
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able to induce belief about any given subject, it seems impossible to determine a
specific field of objects for it. This is what Socrates now seems to recant.22 Rheto-
ric may indeed be termed a techne¯ after all, if, that is, it has real knowledge of its
subject as its foundation. But since Socrates is to claim that it is the art of dialectic
that gives this kind of knowledge, and since rhetoric seems to deal with every-
thing, dialectic seems, after all, to be a universal method which can deliver knowl-
edge on any given subject.
Before we accept this conclusion, however, we may stop and ask why Plato
should believe that one method, a kind of mathesis universalis, could ever be
able to give man knowledge of everything. For it is not only in the Gorgias that
we find arguments depending on the notion that an art, a techne¯, is concerned
with one specific field of objects only. Such arguments can be found throughout
the corpus platonicum. In light of this, it may be worth noting that Socrates'
conception of rhetoric in the Phaedrus is radically different from the one espoused
by Gorgias, a fact that Phaedrus at once points out. For by rhetoric, Socrates does
not simply understand the ability to temporarily produce convictions in others in
a law-court or at a political assembly. Rather, he regards it as a “way of directing
[or leading] the soul [psychago¯gia] by means of speech”, not only in public but also
in private (261a). This notion of rhetoric, which Socrates repeats at 271d, casts
interesting light on what Socrates apparently understands by rhetoric turned
into real art.
Let us therefore take a closer look at it. The ability to lead souls is first
described, at 261e, as the art of being able to deceive others as well as to detect
others who try to deceive one. According to Socrates, deception relies on two
things. First of all, it relies on the fact that certain things that aren't alike, look
alike. If anyone is to convince someone else that a course of action that is
really harmful is good, that course of action must at least appear good. But this
means that the art of deception requires knowledge of which things look alike
and which do not, since, according to Socrates, it is only possible to deceive
someone about things that differ little from each other (261e). It is no good to
try to convince someone that a butcher is in fact a sophist. If someone were to
depict Socrates as a sophist, however…
It is in order to explain this point that Socrates, at 263a-b, introduces the
distinction between words, the meaning of which are evident to all, and words
the meaning of which are contested, i.e. words where people do not agree
about what they mean, either with others or indeed with themselves. Apparently,
contested terms are names designating things that are difficult to understand, or
words that have a somewhat blurry connotation or are disputed for some reason
or other. The examples Socrates gives are the good, the just and, of course, eros.
So, in order to lead people's souls, i.e. in order to deceive them about these things,
knowledge is required, and not only a knowledge of which terms are contested
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and which are not, but also of what these contested terms really refer to, i.e. what
the essence of the contested term is. At least this seems to be the point when
Socrates, at 262a9-11, asks Phaedrus whether it “is … really possible for
someone who doesn't know what each thing truly is to detect a similarity.” So
the ability to lead a soul of someone, through deception, requires real knowledge
about the subject matter one wishes to deceive someone about as well as knowl-
edge of which things it resembles. It is not quite clear from the passage what this
knowledge consists in, but the fact that Socrates immediately contrasts it with the
chasing of mere opinions (262c) clearly suggests that by knowledge Socrates
means real, substantive understanding. Socrates' claim must therefore be that
only the man who really knows what justice, the good and such things are, i.e.
have an understanding of their essence or being, and how they differ from and
relate to other things, is able to deceive others. It seems fair to claim that it is
this knowledge that dialectic will supposedly give the rhetorician.
How does this relate to my problem about the universality of dialectic? Well, it
is at least clear that Socrates claims that dialectic can help the rhetorician to
acquire understanding of only about a limited number of ‘objects’, such as the
just and the good and eros (which is, we should remember, essentially connected
with the human soul). This may of course be regarded as a consequence of the
claim that real deception is only possible about such notions but it seems – I
grant that this is not compelling – that Socrates is suggesting that what he calls
disputed terms is what dialectic deal with. But even if I am right about this,
we seem to be faced by a number of other paradoxes as a consequence of Socrates'
claim that dialectic can deliver a foundation for an art of rhetoric.
First of all, Socrates' strategy seems to imply that a man like Lysias or for that
matter Gorgias, who only relies on what people in general believe about a subject
matter, who merely chase opinions, are not able to deceive anyone at all! Only the
philosopher is able to deceive his fellow men. So again, what Socrates seems to say
is this: look my fine fellows, Gorgias, Lysias and Phaedrus, if you want to be able
to deceive someone about something, you need to turn your attention to
philosophy.
This can of course be read as another protreptic argument. But even if we do
that, Socrates claim is truly surprising. For it implies that Lysias is not really able
to deceive anyone. But why is Socrates then so interested in discussing his speech
with Phaedrus and why does he end his palinode with the prayer that Lysias
should turn to philosophy in order that Phaedrus may stop wandering in two
directions (257b)? Are we to conclude that it is Socrates' speeches that are really
deceptive and that this deception is founded on his understanding of eros?
Socrates suggests as much at 265a and I am inclined to think that this is how
Plato meant us to understand the passage.
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But if this is so, we seem to be faced with a second dilemma.We would perhaps
like to say that itmust be Socrates' first speech that was deceptive (being, as Socrates
said at 242d, a horrible (deinos) speech on eros),whereas his secondmust be the true
one. But this seems to be ruled out. For at 266a Socrates claims that the first speech
found “a sort of love that can be called ‘left-handed,’ which it correctly [or with
justice] denounced.” If left-handed love is rightly denounced, and we have no
good reasons for believing that it isn't, why should we regard Socrates' first
speech as deceptive? We may then wonder whether it is the second speech which
is deceptive.23 Wemay ask: has Socrates been trying to deceive Phaedrus into phil-
osophy? By telling his myth about the soul? Is the myth specifically designed as a
noble lie about the nature of eros, intended to turn the rather simple-minded Phae-
drus away from Lysian-styled rhetoric towards philosophy? And is Socrates only
able to compose his myth by having a good understanding of the nature of eros
as well as of the nature of the human soul in general and of the soul of Phaedrus
in particular? This reading may seem to be exaggerated, and I am not entirely
sure whether this is the conclusion to draw. Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile
to consider as a serious suggestion and that there is textual support for it. This will,
however, leave us with a final paradox.
Through a – perhaps somewhat ironical – argument, running from 270a-271d,
Socrates picks up on the notion of rhetoric as a real art, characterized as a leading
of souls. It is here defined analogous to medicine and is said to “be able … to
supply a soul with reasons and customary rules that will impart to it the convic-
tions and virtues we want.” (270b5-9). So, like Gorgian rhetoric, true rhetoric
imparts certain convictions to its ‘victims’, though, we may suppose, it differs
from it by the facts that the effect is supposed to be of a more permanent
nature, that its goal is ‘noble’ insofar as it is to install virtue in its listener and
that it is carried out in private, not in public. Since this kind of rhetoric, like
all rhetoric, is directed towards human beings, Socrates at 270e states that it
must “demonstrate precisely the essential nature of that to which speeches are
to be applied. And that, surely, is the soul.” What is meant by such a precise
demonstration has been made clear a few lines above, at 270d. To determine
the nature of anything, Socrates there claims, one must first determine whether
the object is simple or complex. If it is simple, one should then try to determine
the power of the object. If, “on the other hand, it takes many forms, we must enu-
merate them all and, as we did in the simple case, investigate how each is naturally
able to act upon what and how it has a natural disposition to be acted upon by
what.” A little later, at 271a4-7, Socrates can therefore conclude that anyone
who wishes to “teach the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul
with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is: whether it is
one and homogeneous by nature or takes many forms”. After that he will have
to determine what it does and what it suffers. Finally, he will need to know
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each kind of logos, in order to understand which types of speeches will appear
convincing to which kinds of souls.
Apart from the clear allusion to Socrates' initial question pertaining to his own
nature, this passage is indeed a clear reminder of the content of the palinode. The
myth of the soul, describing the essence and the form of the soul, seems to be
what we need in order to turn rhetoric into art. So perhaps it is not so absurd
to say that dialectic, as described in the Phaedrus, is not a universal method
which enables us to acquire knowledge, but is really about soul, nor to say that
Socrates' second speech delivers knowledge of the soul and that this knowledge
enables him to deceive Phaedrus, where the deception must be understood, of
course, as a noble lie, implanting reasons and customary rules into Phaedrus, i.
e. giving him the convictions and virtues that Socrates want.
The paradox this gives us, however, can be spelled out as two serious problems
facing this otherwise edifying conclusion. The first concerns the action or drama
of the dialogue, the second its argument.24 If we are to regard the palinode as
Socrates' rhetorical, or perhaps poetic, attempt to turn the soul of Phaedrus
towards philosophy, which at the same time describes the knowledge which
enables him to make this speech, we may wonder why it apparently has no
effect on Phaedrus. Phaedrus does not at any point comment positively on the
content of what Socrates has said. Nor does anything in the second part of the
dialogue suggest that Phaedrus has changed his interest from rhetoric to
philosophy.25
The second problem is that the palinode itself seems to make Socrates' pro-
posed philosophical rhetoric impossible. For if it is true that it is impossible for
a human being to say what form the soul has, if all we can do is to say what it
is like, the idea that rhetoric must state with utmost precision what the soul is,
how many types of it there are, how they are affected and by what kinds of
speeches, how many kinds of speeches there really are (as can be seen from the
passage 271d-272b, the list is very long), we may begin to suspect, as Phaedrus
seems to do, that the task is impossible. Could Socrates' failure at turning Phae-
drus to philosophy be due to the fact that he cannot really know who Phaedrus is?
And if so – we should remember that Socrates begins the dialogue by saying that if
he has forgotten his Phaedrus, he has forgotten himself (228a, cf. also 236c) – does
this mean that Socrates does in fact not really know who he is?
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